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8.1 Introduction
Rapid trade liberalizations undertaken by many developing and transi-
tion countries during the past decade have inspired heated public discus-
sions. Proponents of trade liberalization posit that for developing coun-
tries, many of which are small economies with abundant labor, opening
would lead to rising wages. They point to the substantial increases in aver-
age real wages that have been taking place in open economies in the devel-
oping world over the last several decades as evidence that trade does indeed
increase demand for the abundant factor—in this case, labor—much like
trade theory would predict. In contrast, opponents of trade liberalization
speak about the uneven distribution of gains from openness to trade and
resulting increases in wage inequality. They also claim that liberalization
will lead to a “race to the bottom” in wages and, as a consequence, to im-
poverishment of workers.
There exists little conclusive evidence about the eﬀects of trade liberal-
ization on wages. Two shortcomings of the early literature have been the
use of average industry wage data, which are assumed to be independent of
characteristics of workers in the industry, and the focus on outcomes (e.g.,
exports, imports, prices) instead of policy measures (e.g., tariﬀs). Only re-
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examine the impact of liberalization on industry wage premiums, which
measure the portion of wages that cannot be explained by a worker’s or a
ﬁrm’s characteristics but can be explained by a worker’s industry aﬃlia-
tion. However, the conclusions of such studies have been mixed. On the one
hand, Revenga (1997) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) provide evidence
suggesting that trade liberalization erodes the wages of workers in previ-
ously protected sectors. On the other hand, Pavcnik et al. (2004) ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant relationship between liberalization and industry wage premi-
ums, and Gaston and Treﬂer (1994) show that liberalization is associated
with a higher industry wage premium.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between trade liberalization
and wages to understand the channel through which trade liberalization
aﬀects the wage structure and, indirectly, the linkage between trade and
poverty. Unlike the existing studies, which are based on U.S. or Latin
American data, this paper focuses on Poland, a central European country
undergoing the transition from planned to market economy. Factor en-
dowments in Poland diﬀer from those in the countries previously exam-
ined. The share of the population aged ﬁfteen to seventy-ﬁve with a college
education, 10.7 percent in 1999, is lower than that in the United States, yet
unlike many Latin American countries Poland attained universal literacy
among the population due to its socialist legacy. Poland’s proximity to the
European Union market combined with its high level of human develop-
ment may make it better positioned relative to Latin American countries
to absorb new technologies and reap productivity gains from trade liberal-
ization. Thus, it may not be surprising that the relationship between trade
liberalization and wages in Poland diﬀers from that found in studies focus-
ing on Latin America.
We are interested in the impact of trade liberalization on wages because
it has important implications for income inequality and poverty. Industries
diﬀer in the composition of workforce, with some having a higher propor-
tion of skilled labor than others. If trade liberalization erodes wages, and if
tariﬀ reduction is greater in sectors with a disproportionate percentage of
unskilled labor, as was the case in Poland, then the unskilled could experi-
ence a greater decline in earnings. As in other countries, educational at-
tainment is a powerful predictor of poverty status in Poland. For instance,
while fewer than 0.6 percent of households headed by a person with a col-
lege education were subject to hard poverty in 2001, the same was true of
12 percent of households headed by an individual with a secondary voca-
tional degree and 18 percent of households whose head had only primary
education. As is evident from table 8.1, the ﬁgures for medium poverty
were equally striking. Moreover, this pattern persisted throughout the
whole period of our study, 1994–2001 (Topinska and Kuhl 2003).
The eﬀect of trade liberalization on income distribution and poverty is
338 Chor-ching Goh and Beata S. Javorciklikely to be larger in Poland than in other countries due to the rigidity of
the Polish labor market and the slow change in the regional distribution
of economic activities (see appendix table 8A.1). Thus, even a moderate
change in wages across industries is likely to exacerbate the existing re-
gional disparities in incomes and poverty incidence illustrated in ﬁgure 8.1.
The rigidity of Poland’s labor regulations is an advantage in our analysis:
with the limited labor mobility across sectors in the short and medium
term, a worker’s industry aﬃliation is the immediate channel through
which the eﬀects of trade liberalization will be felt. As illustrated in ﬁgure
8.2, employers in Poland are more restricted in their hiring and ﬁring deci-
sions relative to their counterparts in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Russia,
Brazil, Colombia, or Mexico, to name just a few. Figure 8.2 presents the in-
dex of hiring and ﬁring ﬂexibility compiled by the Global Competitiveness
Report (GCR), published jointly by the Geneva-based World Economic
Forum and the Center for International Development at Harvard Univer-
sity in 1996. It is a country-speciﬁc measure that quantiﬁes the average re-
sponse to the survey question “Is hiring and ﬁring of workers ﬂexible
enough?” It takes on the value of 6 for a very ﬂexible labor market and 1 in
the case of the most rigid ones. Since it is based on the views of “business
practitioners” in each country, it captures not only laws on the books but
also their enforcement. According to this index, Singapore and Hong
Kong had the most ﬂexible labor markets, while Poland ranked twenty-
ﬁfth out of forty-nine countries. While for Singapore and Hong Kong the
index value was above 5, the United Kingdom, Brazil, the Czech Republic,
and Russia (among other countries) had an index above 4; the index for
Poland was equal to 3.6. A similar picture emerges from ﬁgure 8.3, which
presents the index on the ﬂexibility of individual dismissal compiled by
Djankov et al. (2001).1Unlike the GCR index in the previous ﬁgure, this in-
dex is based on the existing regulations rather than their enforcement. In
addition to being limited by rigid labor markets, which hinder worker real-
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Table 8.1 Hard and medium poverty in Poland in 2001
Poverty head count (%)
Education of household head Hard poverty Medium poverty
Tertiary 0.57 1.29
Secondary general 3.75 6.96
Secondary vocational 12.16 19.01
Primary 17.72 26.76
Total 9.60 15.17
Source: Topinska and Kuhl (2003).
1. We are grateful to Simeon Djankov for providing us with the index.location across sectors, labor mobility across regions is limited in Poland
due to a housing shortage and prohibitive rent costs (for evidence see De-
ichmann and Henderson 2004; Przybyla and Rutkowski 2004). The ab-
sence of labor mobility, especially in the short and medium term, is also
found in other studies in this volume, namely in Topalova’s work on India
(chap. 7) and Goldberg and Pavcnik’s paper on Colombia (chap. 6).
The second advantage of choosing Poland as the subject of our analysis
is the fact that the changes in its tariﬀs can be treated as exogenous, as they
were stipulated by the Association Agreement between the European Com-
munity and Poland signed in 1991. This agreement predetermined the
schedule of tariﬀ reductions that took place during the period of interest,
1994–2001. Moreover, since the goals of the agreement were free movement
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Fig. 8.1 Regional incidence of poverty in Poland in 2001
Source: Topinska and Kuhl (2003).of goods between the two entities and Poland’s accession to the European
Union, all tariﬀs on manufactured products (with the exception of pro-
cessed food) were brought down to zero by 2001. Poland’s trade liberaliza-
tion was rapid and encompassed a drastic reduction in tariﬀs, which went
from over 20 percent in leather manufacturing and over 15 percent in wood,
nonmetallic, rubber, and plastic products in 1991 to zero within a decade.
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Fig. 8.2 Rigidity of Poland’s labor market in international comparison: Index I
Source: World Economic Forum (1996).
Fig. 8.3 Rigidity of Poland’s labor market in international comparison: Index II
Source: Djankov et al. (2001).We investigate the relationship between trade liberalization and wages
in an expanded Mincerian wage equation. We pool together information
from Labor Force Surveys conducted during the 1994–2001 period into
one regression. Controlling for worker-, ﬁrm-, sector-, and location-
speciﬁc characteristics as well as year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects, we expand
the wage equation to include tariﬀ variables. The analysis covers fourteen
manufacturing sectors, including electricity production. Given the nature
of the speciﬁcation used, our attention is restricted to employed individu-
als, and thus we do not consider the implications of trade liberalization for
unemployment.
We ﬁnd that workers in industries with lower tariﬀs tend to have higher
wages. This result is robust to including year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects, in-
dustry exports, imports, concentration, and capital accumulation, in addi-
tion to controlling for detailed worker characteristics. The result is consis-
tent with a reduction in tariﬀs leading to increased competitive pressures
in the liberalizing industry that forces companies to restructure and im-
prove their productivity, which in turn results in the gains being shared
with employees. This interpretation is in line with the ﬁndings of many
studies that established a positive association between trade liberalization
and productivity.2 To further support this interpretation we employ ﬁrm-
level data for the period 1996–2000 to demonstrate that trade liberalization
indeed resulted in the increased productivity in liberalizing sectors. The
robust and signiﬁcant relationship between a reduction in tariﬀs and an in-
crease in wages is also consistent with the stylized fact that there is much
ineﬃciency in a planned economy; a sector that is exposed to greater for-
eign competition during the transition becomes more eﬃcient and pro-
ductive. Another possible explanation for the ﬁnding is that trade liberal-
ization makes imported inputs cheaper, which enhances the proﬁtability of
the ﬁrms relying on such inputs. The ﬁndings of Amiti and Konings (2005)
appear to support this hypothesis, but because of the aggregated nature of
our industry classiﬁcation, we are not able to investigate this hypothesis in
depth.
Further, our ﬁndings do not suggest any erosion of wages of the un-
skilled (i.e., race to the bottom in wages) from trade liberalization, as they
hold when we exclude skilled workers from the sample. Moreover, our data
indicate that industries with a greater reduction in tariﬀs are also those
with higher proportions of the unskilled.
This study is organized as follows. The next section presents some facts
on Poland’s trade liberalization. It is followed by a description of the em-
pirical strategy and the data employed in the analysis. Then we present the
estimation results. The last section concludes.
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2. See Harrison (1994) for Côte d’Ivoire, Krishna and Mitra (1998) for India, Kim (2000)
for Korea, Pavcnik (2002) for Chile, and Fernandes (2003) for Colombia.8.2 Trade Liberalization in Poland
In September 1989 Poland’s ﬁrst non-Communist government since the
end of World War II assumed power, taking over the economy with a large
budget deﬁcit and triple-digit inﬂation. On January 1, 1990, the govern-
ment implemented a bold reform program (the “Balcerowicz plan”) aimed
at stabilizing the economy and beginning the process of economic liberal-
ization and privatization. During the initial period of transition (1990–91)
Poland experienced a deep recession, followed by a strong recovery, with
the average annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) equal to
almost 5 percent during the 1992–2000 period.
Transition to a market economy completely revolutionized Poland’s in-
ternational trade. The country moved from a centrally planned system of ex-
ports and imports conducted by state trading agencies under the arrange-
ments of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to a free market
where local producers suddenly become subject to the forces of competi-
tion. In 1991, trading under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
collapsed, and in December of the same year Poland signed an Association
Agreement with the European Community, which was a prelude to its fu-
ture membership in the European Union (EU). In July of 1995 Poland
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Severe recessions in Poland’s
traditional export markets coupled with lowering of tariﬀs in Western Eu-
ropean countries resulted in massive reorientation of Polish international
trade from East to West.
The Association Agreement signed by Poland (and other central and
eastern European countries) stipulated asymmetric phase-out of import
tariﬀs with the goal of free trade in industrial goods by 2001. As a result, in
1999 the average Polish tariﬀ on imports from the EU, the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA), and Central European Free Trade Agreement
(CEFTA) countries was brought down to 6.5 percent, as compared to the
most-favored-nation (MFN) rate of 15.6 percent and the 34.6 percent rate
applied to non-WTO members. The rapid liberalization of trade in manu-
facturing products was not, however, accompanied by similar changes in
agricultural goods. While in 1999 the simple average applied MFN rate on
manufacturing products was equal to 11.1 percent, the corresponding ﬁg-
ure for agriculture was 34.2 percent. The diﬀerence largely reﬂects the
tariﬃcation of variable levies agreed upon by Poland during the Uruguay
Round. As Poland was a nonmarket economy for the base years of 1986–
88, selected in the Uruguay Round for estimating tariﬀ equivalents of non-
tariﬀ barriers prohibited on agricultural products, Poland applied the gen-
erally much higher EU tariﬀ rates as the basis for tariﬃcation, and thus
considerably increased its protection of the agricultural sector (WTO
2000).
Panels A and B of ﬁgure 8.4show the reduction in sectoral tariﬀs applied
Trade Protection and Industry Wage Structure in Poland 343to imports from the EU and from the world, respectively, between 1994 and
2001. The largest reduction, of 23 percentage points, was observed in
leather and leather products, followed by a 15 percentage point or higher
reduction in other nonmetallic products, rubber and plastic products,
wood and wood products, and other manufacturing. The smallest change
was registered in tariﬀs on electricity and natural gas, which were low to
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A
B
Fig. 8.4 Reduction in Poland’s import tariﬀs between 2001 and 1994: A, trade lib-
eralization vis-à-vis the EU; B, trade liberalization vis-à-vis the world
Source: World Bank’s WITS database (http://192.91.247.38/tab/WITS.asp).begin with. By 1999 all industrial products from the EU were entering
Poland duty free, with the exception of food, beverages, and tobacco prod-
ucts; motor vehicles; and petroleum and petroleum products. However,
imports from the world were still subject to tariﬀs. As of 1999, about 
three-quarters of Poland’s exports and imports were conducted under 
preferential trading arrangements and thus subject to preferential tariﬀs.
As detailed in appendix B, the Association Agreement predetermined
the speed and extent of trade liberalization, which allows us to treat tariﬀ
changes as exogenous. Since many agricultural products and processed
foods, beverages, and tobacco were excluded from the liberalization speci-
ﬁed in the agreement and/or remained subject to quantitative restrictions,
we will not include them in the analysis.
8.3 Related Literature
The theoretical context for our analysis is provided by the speciﬁc-
factors model. The model focuses on the short run and assumes that fac-
tors of production are immobile across sectors. Given the rigidities present
in Poland’s labor market, this model constitutes a suitable basis for think-
ing about the relationship between trade and wages in the Polish context.
The model predicts a positive association between protection and industry
wages. Protection reduces imports, and reduced imports increase labor de-
mand, which in turn increases wages. This mechanism raises wages in the
protected industry relative to the economy-wide average wage.
The second channel through which trade and protection aﬀect wages is
imperfectly competitive factor markets. For example, unions may extract
part of the rents from protection in the form of more jobs rather than
higher wages. Unionization is not a material issue in our analysis because
the power of trade unions has been substantially weakened during the
transition process. Trade union density in Poland has dropped from 80
percent of the workforce in 1989 to 14 percent in 2002. The highest trade
union density was observed in mining (43.8 percent) and nontradable sec-
tors such as transport (27.3 percent) and education (27.5 percent; Boeri
and Garibaldi 2003).
The third channel through which trade and protection aﬀect wages is
imperfectly competitive product markets. Trade and protection aﬀect the
strategic interaction between ﬁrms, which in turn aﬀects ﬁrm performance
and wages. For example, if trade protection promotes entry into an indus-
try by enhancing the proﬁtability of existing ﬁrms, and if new entrants face
setup costs, then protection promotes ineﬃcient entry and raises average
production costs (Horstmann and Markusen 1986).
Another strand of literature particularly relevant to a transition econ-
omy, like Poland, which until 1990 was heavily protected and not subject to
market forces and competition, is the literature on trade liberalization and
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crease in trade protection have been illustrated in the literature using the
computable general equilibrium models (for example, Cox and Harris
1985; Brown, Deardorﬀ, and Stern 1992). There is also strong evidence
from the ﬁndings of ﬁrm-level studies that reduction in trade protection re-
sults in productivity improvement. The competition eﬀect from imports
has been documented by many empirical studies (Roberts and Tybout
1997). For instance, Pavcnik (2002) ﬁnds that the productivity of plants in
the import-competing sectors grew 3 to 10 percent faster than the produc-
tivity in the nontraded goods sector during trade liberalization in Chile,
suggesting that exposure to international competition forces previously
shielded plants to improve their performance. Fernandes (2003) demon-
strates that trade liberalization in Colombia has increased plant-level pro-
ductivity, primarily through gains in within-plant productivity. Other stud-
ies reaching similar conclusions include Harrison (1994) for Côte d’Ivoire,
Krishna and Mitra (1998) for India, Kim (2000) for Korea, and Hay (2001)
and Muendler (2005) for Brazil.
8.4 Data and Methodology
8.4.1 Labor Force Survey
The analysis is based on the data collected through the Polish Labor Force
Survey (LFS). The survey has been conducted four times each year since
the fall of 1992, and we have access to selected quarters of the surveys dur-
ing the period 1992–2001. Unfortunately, it is not possible to employ all
eleven years in the analysis, because the 1992 and 1993 surveys were based
on a diﬀerent industry classiﬁcation. Thus, our analysis covers the period
1994–2001. We use the second quarter of years 1993 through 2001, except
in years 1999 and 2001, for which only information for the ﬁrst quarter was
available to us.
The survey sample is representative of the country’s population. Sam-
pling for the LFS follows the two-stage household sampling. First, the
stratiﬁcation is based on voivodships (administrative districts), and pri-
mary sampling units are sampled from each stratum with diversiﬁed sam-
pling probability, proportional to the number of households in a primary
sampling unit. Second, a determined number of households are selected
randomly from each primary sampling unit, depending on the size of pri-
mary sampling units. For example, eight households are sampled from pri-
mary sampling units from rural municipalities, and ﬁve households are
sampled from primary sampling units from large cities.
Between 1993 and 1998, the sample was interviewed only in the middle
month of the quarter, whereas after 1999 a uniform number of randomly
selected households was interviewed in every week of the thirteen weeks
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terviewed, amounting to about 40,000 individuals sampled. Members of
households aged above ﬁfteen were asked questions on their employment
status, type of employer, sector of employment, monthly earnings, weekly
hours worked, and personal characteristics. Unfortunately, wage informa-
tion on the self-employed is not available, because the self-employed were
not asked questions about earnings. Employees make up about 70 percent
of the sample in the survey, the self-employed represent another 25 per-
cent, and the remaining 5 percent are unpaid family workers. Employment
sectors are classiﬁed according to a variant of the European NACE classi-
ﬁcation system, which includes thirty-four sectors, fourteen of which per-
tain to manufacturing activities.
8.4.2 Empirical Framework
We investigate the relationship between trade liberalization and wages
by estimating a reduced-form model with the logarithm of real hourly
wages being the dependent variable. The real hourly wage is calculated by
deﬂating the reported monthly wage to 1992 zlotys using the Consumer
Price Index from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and dividing
it by the number of hours worked in the reporting week multiplied by the
number of weeks (4.2). Our sample is restricted to individuals of ages 15–
75 inclusive, employed in the manufacturing and electricity sectors. We
estimate the following wage equation (1) by pooling all workers from the
1994–2001 Labor Force Surveys:
(1) ln wit    Xit    Tariﬀjt    j    t   εit,
where ln wit is the log of real wages of worker i employed in industry j and
observed in the LFS in year t. Note that the data set is not a true panel but
consists of repeated cross sections. Xit is the vector of worker characteris-
tics, which include age, age squared, marital status, gender, a dummy for
the educational attainment category, a dummy for the occupation cate-
gory, a dummy for employment in the private sector, a dummy for the geo-
graphic region (voivoidship), and a dummy for the size of the city where the
worker lives. Tariﬀjt represents the average tariﬀ applied to imports of in-
dustry j’s products in year t. The ﬁxed eﬀect for the worker’s industry aﬃli-
ation is denoted by  j, and  t is the year ﬁxed eﬀect. Year ﬁxed eﬀects are
included to absorb economy-wide shocks that may aﬀect wages, while in-
dustry dummies control for sector-speciﬁc eﬀects, such as prevalence of la-
bor unions. The standard errors are clustered on industry-year combina-
tions.
Tariﬀjt is deﬁned as the simple average of tariﬀs on products of industry
j imported at time t. We use tariﬀs vis-à-vis the EU as well as tariﬀs per-
taining to imports from the world. We experiment with trade-weighted av-
erage tariﬀs, and the results are similar to those for the simple averages;
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Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.
We estimate the eﬀects of tariﬀ changes on workers’ wages while con-
trolling for the individual worker’s characteristics as well as for other po-
tential inﬂuences (e.g., geographic and sectoral variables). Later, we also
allow returns to schooling to vary by years. To eliminate a potential omit-
ted-variable bias, we also include such controls as the Herﬁndahl index,
measuring concentration in the industry, capital accumulation in the in-
dustry, stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector, and sectoral
imports and exports. We use lagged values to avoid potential simultaneity
bias. The Herﬁndahl index pertains to the four largest ﬁrms in the sector
and is calculated based on ﬁrm-level data from the Amadeus database cov-
ering the period 1994–2001. The information on capital accumulation
comes from various issues of the Polish Statistical Yearbook. The FDI ﬁg-
ures are from the Foreign Trade Research Institute (various issues). Trade
data come from the United Nations COMTRADE database.
8.5 Descriptive Statistics
Before proceeding to the empirical results, we brieﬂy discuss the sum-
mary statistics. As presented in table 8.2, the average age of workers in our
sample was thirty-eight in 1994 and increased to about thirty-nine in 2001.
Average hours of work remained quite steady at about forty-one hours
throughout the period, with the exception of 2001, when a decline to thirty-
nine was registered. About three-quarters of workers in our sample were
married, and females constituted less than half of the sample (45 to 47 per-
cent) throughout the period. In 1994, only 24 percent of workers were em-
ployed in the private sector, but by 2001 this ﬁgure increased to 48 percent.
The real average hourly wage increased by about 50 percent between 1994
and 2001.
The educational attainments increased during the period considered.
The proportion of workers with primary school education or less fell from
13.57 percent to 10.24 percent. The shares of workers with general sec-
ondary education or vocational education have remained constant at 7
percent and 35 percent, respectively. The percentage of workers with terti-
ary education rose—the share of those with university degrees increased
from 12.68 to 15.47 percent.
Table 8.3presents the distribution of labor across industries in each year
during the 1994–2001 period. The ﬁgures reﬂect structural changes taking
place in the economy during this period, namely a fall in agricultural and
mining employment and a rise of service sectors, which until 1990 had been
underdeveloped. As for the latter, a particularly strong expansion was ob-
served in wholesale and retail trade (43 percent growth), hotel services (71
percent growth), and ﬁnancial, banking, and real estate services (43 per-
348 Chor-ching Goh and Beata S. Javorcikcent). Employment in manufacturing industries remained relatively stable
with the exception of plastic and rubber products, which registered an 89
percent growth, whereas machinery contracted, halving its share.
The changes in the economic structure have also aﬀected the role of
unions in the Polish economy. Mining and machinery sectors used to be in-
dustries with strong union presence, but the large fall in employment in
these industries contributed to erosion of unions in Poland, as was the case
in many other European countries where sectors with the highest numbers
of union members had contracted (Boeri and Garibaldi 2003). Unioniza-
tion has also become weaker because of privatization and the increase in
the number of smaller enterprises. Historically, 100 percent of large state-
owned enterprises (250  employees) and 75 percent of medium-sized
state-owned enterprises (50–250 employees) had two or more unions. Af-
ter being privatized, however, only 5 percent of large private companies
had unions. Moreover, unions are totally absent in newly created small
private companies (Gardawski et al. 1998). Thus, unionization was not a
signiﬁcant force in Poland during the period of our analysis.
Within each industry, we observe changes in the composition of the la-
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Table 8.2 Summary statistics
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Real hourly wage (in PLN) 1.05 1.07 1.15 1.24 1.31 1.33 1.44 1.51
(.57) (.58) (.64) (.74) (.70) (.78) (1.0) (1.2)
Age 38.0 38.3 38.5 38.3 38.2 38.6 38.6 39.3
(9.7) (9.8) (9.8) (10.0) (10.1) (10.2) (10.1) (10.6)
Weekly hours worked 41.6 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.6 41.1 40.5 39.3
(7.9) (7.7) (7.5) (7.4) (7.3) (6.9) (8.2) (9.4)
Married (%) 78 77 76 75 75 75 75 74
Female (%) 45 46 47 46 46 47 47 47
Working in private sector (%) 24 26 30 34 38 40 41 48
Highest education level 
attained (% by categories)
Primary or less 13.57 13.5 12.7 11.79 10.85 10.73 10.03 10.24
Basic vocational 34.83 34.78 35.24 35.95 35.78 35.12 35.09 34.23
General secondary 7.65 7.39 6.86 6.64 6.63 6.67 6.68 7.27
Two-year college or 
secondary vocational 31.26 31.57 31.71 32.29 32.96 33.34 32.78 32.79
University 12.68 12.76 13.5 13.32 13.77 14.14 15.43 15.47
Size of city (% by categories)
100,000 or more people 33.9 32.6 32.0 30.4 29.3 29.1 27.8 29.4
Less than 100,000 people 35.8 37.3 38.5 38.7 37.5 38.1 39.4 38.6
Village 30.3 30.1 29.5 30.9 33.2 32.8 32.8 32.0
No. of observations 14,733 15,059 14,528 14,391 14,437 12,917 9,724 10,099
Notes:Standard deviations in parentheses. The sample is restricted to those between ﬁfteen and seventy-
ﬁve years old, employees only. PLN denotes Polish zloty. Real hourly wages are expressed in logarithmic
form.bor force. As illustrated in table 8.4, which presents the share of unskilled
workers in each industry, with the exception of the paper and pulp manu-
facturing and social and communal services sectors, where there have been
increases in the shares of unskilled workers, the other industries registered
declines of diﬀerent magnitudes. Sectors such as construction, agriculture,
wood product manufacturing, and textile manufacturing experienced a
limited fall (3 to 5 percent) in the shares of unskilled workers, whereas in-
dustries such as banking and ﬁnancial services and rubber and plastic
product manufacturing observed larger declines (44 percent and 57 per-
cent, respectively) over time.
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Table 8.3 Distribution of employment by industries, 1994–2001
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agriculture, ﬁshery 0.044 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.024
Mining 0.047 0.044 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.025 0.021
Manufacturing
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.053 0.052 0.054 0.051 0.052
Textiles 0.041 0.046 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.037
Leather 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006
Wood 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.025
Paper products 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012
Petroleum 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003
Chemical 0.014 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.012
Rubber/plastic 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.014
Nonmetallic 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.015
Metal 0.038 0.040 0.039 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.034 0.034
Machinery 0.027 0.028 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.017
Electrical appliances 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.017
Transport equipment 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.016
Other 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.020
Services
Utilities 0.025 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.026
Construction 0.077 0.072 0.068 0.074 0.077 0.076 0.079 0.072
Wholesale and retail trade 0.094 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.108 0.109 0.108 0.134
Hotels and restaurants 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.020
Transport and 
communication 0.073 0.078 0.074 0.080 0.080 0.074 0.076 0.072
Financial, real estate, and 
business activities 0.045 0.051 0.057 0.052 0.055 0.062 0.058 0.064
Public administration 0.066 0.066 0.072 0.073 0.072 0.068 0.074 0.070
Education, health, and 
social work 0.188 0.183 0.194 0.194 0.192 0.207 0.209 0.185
Other community, social, 
and personal service 
activities 0.044 0.038 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.032
All sectors 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000As is evident from ﬁgure 8.5, sectors with a higher proportion of un-
skilled workers experienced a larger reduction in import tariﬀs between
1994 and 2001. The correlation between the unskilled labor share and the
change in tariﬀ is –0.644. The sector with the largest decrease (23 per-
centage points) in the average tariﬀ vis-à-vis the EU is leather manufac-
turing, in which the shares of unskilled labor were 22 percent and 17 per-
cent in 1994 and 2001, respectively. In contrast, the machinery and
equipment industry had the smallest decrease (8 percent) in tariﬀ, and the
shares of unskilled labor were 11 percent and 5 percent in 1994 and 2001,
respectively.
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Table 8.4 Share of unskilled labor (workers with primary or less schooling), by industries,
1994–2001
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agriculture, ﬁshery 0.335 0.357 0.346 0.309 0.336 0.323 0.313 0.283
Mining 0.140 0.141 0.121 0.105 0.114 0.094 0.113 0.104
Manufacturing
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.191 0.182 0.194 0.169 0.159 0.154 0.130 0.158
Textiles 0.166 0.138 0.147 0.143 0.129 0.129 0.161 0.108
Leather 0.217 0.200 0.190 0.179 0.129 0.135 0.180 0.167
Wood 0.218 0.204 0.223 0.174 0.156 0.230 0.211 0.199
Paper products 0.156 0.154 0.142 0.149 0.116 0.096 0.228 0.191
Petroleum 0.183 0.197 0.137 0.128 0.146 0.125 — 0.091
Chemical 0.120 0.162 0.191 0.159 0.124 0.120 0.113 0.100
Rubber/plastic 0.169 0.168 0.258 0.234 0.134 0.183 0.073 0.118
Nonmetallic 0.265 0.237 0.199 0.230 0.209 0.199 0.185 0.172
Metal 0.162 0.152 0.150 0.132 0.120 0.132 0.096 0.101
Machinery 0.101 0.107 0.076 0.059 0.060 0.086 0.074 0.052
Electrical appliances 0.135 0.127 0.108 0.081 0.090 0.125 0.114 0.103
Transport equipment 0.133 0.122 0.102 0.098 0.105 0.092 0.083 0.094
Other 0.168 0.148 0.174 0.156 0.133 0.104 0.109 0.140
Services
Utilities 0.113 0.143 0.125 0.109 0.097 0.086 0.096 0.102
Construction 0.163 0.171 0.153 0.167 0.151 0.153 0.153 0.149
Wholesale and retail trade 0.088 0.090 0.092 0.075 0.083 0.078 0.068 0.080
Hotels and restaurants 0.147 0.212 0.158 0.119 0.066 0.097 0.125 0.109
Transport and 
communication 0.140 0.147 0.135 0.123 0.117 0.122 0.102 0.105
Financial, real estate, and 
business activities 0.086 0.064 0.079 0.075 0.067 0.070 0.048 0.067
Public administration 0.069 0.054 0.041 0.045 0.042 0.032 0.036 0.036
Education, health, and 
social work 0.106 0.108 0.105 0.100 0.091 0.091 0.079 0.075
Other community, social, 
and personal service 
activities 0.123 0.139 0.134 0.118 0.116 0.132 0.165 0.1738.6 Empirical Results
Table 8.5 presents the full set of explanatory variables in our basic wage
model, which includes year and industry dummies. Our sample encom-
passes manufacturing (except for the food, beverage, and tobacco sector,
excluded because of the concerns regarding nontariﬀ barriers and tariﬀs
not being predetermined), and the electricity sector. The coeﬃcients on the
worker characteristics are generally signiﬁcant, with the exception of a
dummy for employment in the private sector. The coeﬃcients also have
their expected signs. Older workers tend to earn more. Female workers
with similar characteristics earn on average less than their male counter-
parts; married workers tend to earn more, possibly due to marriage signal-
ing stability; the returns to schooling also have their expected signs, with
signiﬁcantly higher returns for a tertiary education. There are also wage
premiums enjoyed by workers living in larger cities.
Moving on to the variables of interest, the results suggest that industry
tariﬀs are negatively correlated with workers’ hourly wages, controlling for
an individual worker’s characteristics, geographic variables, and employ-
ment in the private sector. Both the coeﬃcient on tariﬀs vis-à-vis the Eu-
ropean Union as well as the coeﬃcient on tariﬀs vis-à-vis the world are
negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 and the 1 percent level, re-
spectively. This ﬁnding indicates that workers in more liberalized sectors
earn more, controlling for all observable characteristics of the worker, the
job, and the industry. This ﬁnding is robust to including year and industry
ﬁxed eﬀects. In this basic speciﬁcation, a 10 percentage point decline in the
industry tariﬀ vis-à-vis the EU is associated with a 2.5 percent increase in
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Fig. 8.5 Share of unskilled labor and tariﬀ reduction (1994–2001)Table 8.5 Eﬀects of trade protection on wages: A basic model, 1994–2001
(dependent variable: log hourly real wage)
(1) (2)
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis European Union –0.254∗∗
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis the world –0.336∗∗∗
Age 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
Age squared –0.0001∗∗∗ –0.0001∗∗∗
Married dummy 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
Female dummy –0.143∗∗∗ –0.143∗∗∗





Service workers –0.407∗∗∗ –0.407∗∗∗
Skilled agricultural workers –0.455∗∗∗ –0.455∗∗∗
Craft workers –0.362∗∗∗ –0.362∗∗∗
Plant and machine operators –0.328∗∗∗ –0.328∗∗∗
Elementary occupations –0.463∗∗∗ –0.463∗∗∗
City size
50K–1 million population –0.048∗∗∗ –0.048∗∗∗
20–50K population –0.052∗∗∗ –0.052∗∗∗
10–20K population –0.102∗∗∗ –0.102∗∗∗
5–10K population –0.070∗∗∗ –0.070∗∗∗
2–5K population –0.099∗∗∗ –0.099∗∗∗
 2K population –0.164∗∗∗ –0.165∗∗∗
Village dummy –0.091∗∗∗ –0.091∗∗∗
Education dummy
Two-year college –0.166∗∗∗ –0.166∗∗∗
Secondary technical –0.253∗∗∗ –0.252∗∗∗
Secondary general education –0.259∗∗∗ –0.259∗∗∗
Vocational education –0.307∗∗∗ –0.306∗∗∗
Primary educated –0.366∗∗∗ –0.366∗∗∗
Less than primary –0.448∗∗∗ –0.448∗∗∗
Voivoidship dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
No. of observations 28,732 28,732
R-squared .410 .410
Notes:The sample is restricted to those between ﬁfteen and seventy-ﬁve years old, employees
only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors. Omitted categories of dummies: city (pop-
ulation above 100 thousand), education (four- or ﬁve-year college degree), occupation (man-
agers).
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.wages of workers employed in the industry. For tariﬀs on imports from the
world the corresponding increase in wages is 3.4 percent.
Next, we add to the basic model controls for industry concentration, sec-
toral imports, and exports to demonstrate that our results are robust to the
inclusion of additional controls. In the top half of table 8.6, we present the
results for the simple average of import tariﬀs in a given industry vis-à-vis
the EU. In the bottom half, we present results employing tariﬀs vis-à-vis
the world. Because the coeﬃcients on worker characteristics remain very
similar to those in the basic speciﬁcation, this and the following tables will
present only the eﬀects of our variables of interest—tariﬀs and sector-
speciﬁc characteristics. The speciﬁcation in column (1) includes the lagged
value of Herﬁndahl index, which captures industry concentration, in addi-
tion to all variables present in the basic speciﬁcation. Controlling for the
industry concentration does not change our earlier conclusion that lower
trade protection is associated with higher wages. In column (2), we include
lagged Herﬁndahl index and lagged imports (expressed in logarithmic
form). In the top portion, with tariﬀs on imports from the EU, we employ
ﬁgures pertaining to trade with the EU. Similarly, when tariﬀs vis-à-vis the
world are used, trade ﬁgures pertain to trade with the world. As before,
tariﬀs are negatively correlated with wages. In column (3), we include
lagged exports (expressed in logarithmic form) in addition to the variables
listed in the previous column. As before, lower tariﬀs are associated with
higher wages, and the eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1 or the 5 percent level. As
for other industry-speciﬁc variables, only lagged exports appear to be statis-
tically signiﬁcant. The positive coeﬃcient on exports suggests that export-
oriented industries oﬀer a wage premium to workers employed there.
To ensure that our tariﬀ variables do not simply proxy for the increased
ability of sectors to export, we conduct two checks. First, we calculate the
correlation between the annual changes in industry tariﬀs vis-à-vis the EU
(or the world) and the annual changes in exports to the EU (or the world).
The correlations are quite low –.02 (.12). For imports, the corresponding
ﬁgures are –.04 (.06). Second, we estimate two additional speciﬁcations:
one with contemporaneous imports and exports but without tariﬀs, and
another one with contemporaneous imports, exports, and tariﬀs. If tariﬀs
simply proxy for the sector’s ability to export, the tariﬀvariable should lose
its signiﬁcance. This is not the case, though. While contemporaneous ex-
ports are positively correlated with industry wages, the coeﬃcient on tariﬀs
remains negative, similar in magnitude to the earlier regressions and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. As before, industry imports do
not appear to have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages.
To address the concern that there may be other sector-speciﬁc time-
varying factors aﬀecting wages, we experiment with additional controls,
such as capital accumulation, stock of FDI, and the share of unskilled la-
bor. The ﬁrst two variables are expressed in logarithms. The last variable
354 Chor-ching Goh and Beata S. JavorcikTable 8.6 Eﬀects of trade protection on wages with additional trade-related measures
(dependent variable: log hourly real wage)
The basic model (speciﬁed in table 8.5) plus additional
control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis  –0.306∗∗∗ –0.259∗∗ –0.257∗∗ –0.327∗∗∗
European Union (.110) (0.110) (0.104) (0.094)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentra- –0.065 –0.097 –0.085 –0.076 –0.111
tion within an industry) (0.062) (0.083) (0.062) (0.053) (0.047)




Contemporaneous imports –0.003 –0.002
(0.011) (0.010)
Contemporaneous exports 0.063∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,798 25,413 25,413 25,798 25,798
R-squared .410 .412 .413 .410 .411
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis  –0.357∗∗∗ –0.290∗∗∗ –0.249∗∗ –0.317∗∗∗
the world (0.081) (0.105) (0.099) (0.091)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentra- –0.064 –0.088 –0.077 –0.039 –0.089
tion within an industry) (0.057) (0.092) (0.063) (0.054) (0.055)




Contemporaneous imports 0.016 –0.009
(0.024) (0.025)
Contemporaneous exports 0.069∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,798 25,413 25,413 25,798 25,798
R-squared .410 .413 .413 .410 .411
Notes: The table only presents selected variables of interest. All columns include the entire set of vari-
ables in the basic model speciﬁed in table 8.5 with additional control variables speciﬁed in respective col-
umns. The sample is restricted to those between ﬁfteen and seventy-ﬁve years old, employees only, in the
manufacturing and electricity sectors. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.has been calculated based on the Labor Force Survey. All three controls en-
ter as ﬁrst lags. Additionally, in all speciﬁcations we include the lagged
value of industry concentration. Results using tariﬀs vis-à-vis the EU are
presented in the upper portion of table 8.7, and those using tariﬀs vis-à-vis
the world are in the lower portion. In column (1), controlling for capital ac-
cumulation and the industry concentration, we still ﬁnd that lower tariﬀs
are associated with higher wages. Also, there is a mildly positive correlation
between capital accumulation and wages. In column (2), we control for the
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Table 8.7 Eﬀects of trade protection on wages with additional sector-speciﬁc
variables (labor shares, capital accumulation, and foreign direct
investment) (dependent variable: log hourly real wage)
The basic model (speciﬁed in table 8.5)
plus additional control variables
(1) (2) (3)
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis  –0.212∗ –0.577∗∗∗ –0.624∗∗∗
European Union (0.122) (0.153) (0.114)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration –0.046 –0.007 –0.362
within an industry) (0.050) (0.106) (0.204)
Lagged capital accumulation 0.032∗∗ –0.012
(0.014) (0.019)
Lagged foreign direct investment 0.008 –0.003
(0.007) (0.009)
Lagged unskilled labor shares 0.673∗∗∗
(0.214)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,798 13,307 11,181
R-squared .410 .421 .415
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis the world –0.279∗∗∗ –0.510∗∗∗ –0.513∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.120) (0.096)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration –0.049 0.013 –0.302
within an industry) (0.047) (0.099) (0.208)
Lagged capital accumulation 0.028∗ –0.017
(0.014) (0.021)
Lagged foreign direct investment 0.001 –0.002
(0.008) (0.009)
Lagged unskilled labor shares 0.637∗∗∗
(0.217)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,798 13,307 11,181
R-squared .410 .421 .415
Note: See notes to table 8.6
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.industry’s concentration and FDI stock in the sector, and similarly we ﬁnd
a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between tariﬀs and wages. However,
FDI stock does not appear to have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages. In col-
umn (3), we control for capital accumulation, FDI, industry concentra-
tion, and the share of unskilled labor. The eﬀect of tariﬀ on wages is still
signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting that workers in sectors with a greater ex-
tent of liberalization beneﬁt from higher wages, even after controlling for
observable individual, sectoral, and geographical characteristics.
As a robustness check, we repeat the above analyses by allowing returns
to schooling to change over time. To do so, we combine our seven educa-
tion categories into three groups—tertiary, secondary, and primary or
less—and interact each education group with year dummies. The results
are very similar. Table 8.8 presents the basic speciﬁcation with additional
controls such as capital accumulation, stock of FDI, and the share of un-
skilled labor. Ceteris paribus, workers in more liberalized sectors receive
higher wages.
As another robustness check, not reported here, we reestimate all the
speciﬁcations, correcting standard errors for clustering on industries
rather than industry-year combinations. Doing so does not change the
conclusions of the paper.
Finally, we exclude skilled workers (i.e., those with university education)
from our sample and present the estimation results of the subsample of un-
skilled workers in table 8.9 and table 8.10. The ﬁndings are very similar to
those for the full sample in terms of the magnitudes of the impact from
tariﬀ reduction and the signiﬁcance levels. The ﬁndings indicate that a re-
duction in the tariﬀis associated with wage increases for unskilled workers,
after controlling for sector- and worker-speciﬁc characteristics. Thus, re-
ductions in trade barriers appear to have beneﬁted the unskilled in terms
of an increase in wages.
In summary, our results suggest that lower trade protection in Poland
has been associated with higher wages for the employed. These ﬁndings are
consistent with those of Gaston and Treﬂer (1994) based on cross-sectional
data for the United States. Below we discuss four potential explanations for
our results. The ﬁrst potential explanation is that output mix has shifted to-
ward the production of labor-intensive goods, raising the return to labor
relative to other factors of production. Since trade protection was greatest
prior to trade reform in labor-intensive sectors, this could explain why
workers in the sectors that had a reduction in protection appear to experi-
ence higher wages. If this was the story, we would expect to see a shift in the
pattern of production or employment toward labor-intensive industries.
The data presented in tables 8.3 and 8A.1 demonstrate, however, that this
was not the case.
The second potential explanation is that a reduction in tariﬀs has been
associated with an increase in ﬁrms’ ability to export. However, as demon-
Trade Protection and Industry Wage Structure in Poland 357strated earlier, there is hardly any correlation between annual changes in
industry tariﬀs and industry exports. Moreover, as illustrated in table 8.6,
controlling for contemporaneous exports does not lead to a decline in the
signiﬁcance level or the magnitude of the estimated eﬀect of tariﬀs.
The third possibility is that trade liberalization increases ﬁrm produc-
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Table 8.8 Eﬀects of trade protection on wages allowing for time-varying returns to
schooling (dependent variable: log hourly real wage)
The basic model (speciﬁed in table 8.5)
plus additional control variables
(1) (2) (3)
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis  –0.226∗ –0.594∗∗∗ –0.640∗∗∗
European Union (0.120) (0.149) (0.110)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration  –0.045 0.005 –0.356∗
within an industry) (0.049) (0.105) (0.201)
Lagged capital accumulation 0.032∗∗ –0.013
(0.014) (0.018)
Lagged foreign direct investment 0.008 0.003
(0.007) (0.009)
Lagged unskilled labor shares 0.629∗∗∗
(0.213)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,798 13,307 11,181
R-squared .407 .418 .411
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis the world –0.282∗∗∗ –0.524∗∗∗ –0.528∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.116) (0.104)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration –0.048 0.026 –0.294
within an industry) (0.046) (0.099) (0.206)
Lagged capital accumulation 0.028∗∗ –0.018
(0.014) (0.020)
Lagged foreign direct investment 0.001 –0.002
(0.008) (0.009)
Lagged unskilled labor shares 0.592∗∗∗
(0.216)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,798 13,307 11,181
R-squared .407 .418 .411
Notes:The table only presents selected variables of interest. All columns include the entire set
of variables in the basic model speciﬁed in table 8.5 except that returns to schooling are now
time-varying. The sample is restricted to those between ﬁfteen and seventy-ﬁve years old, em-
ployees only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.tivity and proﬁtability through access to cheaper or better intermediate in-
puts. While the high level of aggregation in our industry classiﬁcation pre-
vents us from testing this hypothesis explicitly, empirical support for this
hypothesis has been presented by Amiti and Konings (2005). Using plant-
level data from Indonesia, Amiti and Konings ﬁnd that beneﬁts arising
from lower tariﬀs on intermediate inputs are higher than those arising from
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Table 8.9 Subsample of unskilled workers: Eﬀects of trade protection and various trade
measures on wages (dependent variable: log hourly real wage)
The basic model (speciﬁed in table 8.5) 
plus additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis  –0.271∗∗∗ –0.216∗∗ –0.215∗∗ –0.290∗∗∗
European Union (0.103) (0.106) (0.097) (0.089)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentra- –0.045 –0.082 –0.07 –0.048 –0.080
tion within an industry) (0.064) (0.084) (0.062) (0.054) (0.049)




Contemporaneous imports 0.004 0.004
(0.01) (0.010)
Contemporaneous exports 0.058∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 24,370 24,012 24,012 24,370 24,370
R-squared 0.349 0.351 0.352 0.350 0.350
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis the world –0.313∗∗∗ –0.232∗∗ –0.193∗∗ –0.257∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.099) (0.095) (0.088)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentra- –0.045 –0.069 –0.058 –0.0077 –0.047
tion within an industry) (0.060) (0.094) (0.064) (0.051) (0.053)




Contemporaneous imports 0.030 0.009
(0.023) (0.024)
Contemporaneous exports 0.055∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 24,370 24,012 24,012 24,370 24,370
R-squared 0.350 0.352 0.352 0.350 0.350
Note: See notes to table 8.6.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.a reduction in output tariﬀs. Their analysis suggests that a 10 percentage
point fall in tariﬀs increases plant productivity by 1 percent due to lower
output tariﬀs; however, importing ﬁrms enjoy an 11 percent gain as a re-
sult of lower input tariﬀs.
The ﬁnal possibility is that trade liberalization has led to increased com-
petitive pressures in industries, thus forcing ﬁrms to restructure and im-
prove their productivity. This argument is in line with results of many ﬁrm-
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Table 8.10 Subsample of unskilled workers: Eﬀects of trade protection and 
sector-speciﬁc characteristics on wages (dependent variable: log hourly
real wage)
The basic model (speciﬁed in table 8.5)
plus additional control variables
(1) (2) (3)
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis   –0.171 –0.494∗∗∗ –0.541∗∗∗
European Union (0.110) (0.138) (0.104)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration  –0.025 0.025 –0.234
within an industry) (0.049) (0.099) (0.200)
Lagged capital accumulation 0.034∗∗ –0.015
(0.014) (0.018)
Lagged foreign direct investment 0.006 0.002
(0.007) (0.009)
Lagged unskilled labor shares 0.537∗∗
(0.249)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 24,370 12,646 10,621
R-squared 0.350 0.366 0.358
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis the world –0.223∗∗ –0.438∗∗∗ –0.448∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.109) (0.089)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration  –0.028 0.043 –0.180
within an industry) (0.047) (0.094) (0.203)
Lagged capital accumulation 0.030∗∗ –0.020
(0.014) (0.020)
Lagged foreign direct investment –0.00003 –0.002
(0.007) (0.009)
Lagged unskilled labor shares 0.505∗
(0.251)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 24,370 12,646 10,621
R-squared 0.350 0.366 0.358
Note: See notes to table 8.6.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.level studies (e.g., Pavcnik 2002; Fernandes 2003; and Muendler 2005) that
ﬁnd that trade liberalization leads to higher productivity. This channel is
even more plausible in the context of a transition economy, like Poland,
where local ﬁrms were sheltered from any kind of competition until 1990.
To provide further evidence on the plausibility of this channel, we use ﬁrm-
level data for the same period to demonstrate that trade liberalization led
to a higher total factor productivity in Polish ﬁrms. To make this exercise
as comparable as possible to the industry premium results, we use the same
aggregation of industries and a comparable time period (1996–2000). Full
details are provided in appendix C.
Strictly speaking, our results cannot be interpreted as evidence of trade
liberalization leading to poverty reduction, because, unlike Topalova
(chap. 7) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (chap. 6) in their work in this volume,
we do not directly examine the eﬀects of trade liberalization on poverty. Al-
though we do ﬁnd that employed individuals enjoyed favorable outcomes
as a result of trade liberalization, we have not looked into those who were
not in wage employment.
8.7 Conclusions
In this study, we examine the relationship between changes in tariﬀs and
wages during Poland’s trade liberalization in 1994–2001. Our results indi-
cate that a worker’s wages are higher in industries with a larger reduction
in trade protection, after controlling for the individual worker’s character-
istics, such as age, education, gender, marital status, geographic variables,
and employment in the private sector. Our ﬁndings are robust to control-
ling for industry-level exports and imports, degree of concentration, capi-
tal accumulation, FDI stock, and the share of unskilled workers employed.
Moreover, they are not aﬀected by controlling for unobserved but time-
invariant industry characteristics.
This result is consistent with the argument that reduction in trade pro-
tection brings about higher competition from imports, which can enhance
worker productivity and industry performance. The robust and signiﬁcant
relationship between a reduction in tariﬀs and an increase in wages is also
consistent with the stylized fact that there is much ineﬃciency in a planned
economy; a sector that is exposed to greater foreign competition during the
transition becomes more eﬃcient and productive. Another possible expla-
nation is that trade liberalization improves access to cheaper or better in-
termediate inputs, which could enhance proﬁtability.
In addition, we ﬁnd that industries with a larger reduction in tariﬀs are
also those with higher shares of unskilled labor. When we exclude skilled
labor from our sample, the results still hold. Thus, there is no evidence of
trade liberalization leading to an erosion of wages of the unskilled or the
so-called race to the bottom.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Republic of Poland
Article 10 of the Europe Agreement signed in 1991 between Poland and the
European Community stipulated the schedule of liberalization with re-
spect to manufacturing products (Harmonized System chapters 25–97).
This schedule did not cover Harmonized System chapters 1–24, which en-
compass agricultural products, processed foods, beverages, and tobacco
products. The provisions of Article 10 were as follows:
1. Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products origi-
nating in the Community listed in Annex IVa shall be abolished on the date
of entry into force of this Agreement.
Annex IVa covered selected nonagricultural products from the following
headings of the Harmonized System (HS): 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 38, 40, 44,
45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 68, 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87,
88, 90, 97.
2. Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products origi-
nating in the Community which are listed in Annex IVb shall be progres-
sively reduced as speciﬁed in that Annex.
Annex IVb covered selected tariﬀ lines pertaining to motor vehicles (HS
8703, 8704, 8706, and 8707). It speciﬁed that customs duties on imports ap-
plicable in Poland to these products originating in the Community shall be
eliminated according to the following schedule:
• On 1 January 1994 they will be reduced to six-sevenths of the basic
duty.
• On 1 January 1996 they will be reduced to ﬁve-sevenths.
• On 1 January 1998 they will be reduced to four-sevenths.
• On 1 January 1999 they will be reduced to three-sevenths.
• On 1 January 2000 they will be reduced to two-sevenths.
• On 1 January 2001 they will be reduced to one-seventh.
• On 1 January 2002 they will be reduced to zero.
It also speciﬁed a suspension of customs duties within the limit of an an-
nual preferential tariﬀ quota for a certain number of cars starting from
January 1, 1993.
3. Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products origi-
nating in the Community other than those listed in Annexes IVa and IVb
shall be progressively reduced, and abolished by the end of the seventh year
at the latest from the entry into force of this Agreement according to the
following timetable:
364 Chor-ching Goh and Beata S. Javorcik• Three years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each
duty shall be reduced to 80 percent of the basic duty.
• Four years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each
duty shall be reduced to 60 percent of the basic duty.
• Five years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each
duty shall be reduced to 40 percent of the basic duty.
• Six years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each duty
shall be reduced to 20 percent of the basic duty.
• Seven years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement the re-
maining duties shall be eliminated.
Provisions of the Europe Agreement with respect to agricultural products
(HS chapters 1–24) were covered in chapter II, which speciﬁed that
• Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products originat-
ing in the Community listed in Annex XI shall be reduced on the date
of entry into force of the Agreement by 10 percentage points.
Annex XI pertained to selected products from the following HS chapters: 01,
Live Animals; 04, Dairy Produce, Birds’ Eggs, Natural Honey, Edible Prod-
ucts of Animal Origin, not Elsewhere Speciﬁed or Included; 06, Live Trees
and Other Plants, Bulbs, Roots and the Like, Cut Flowers and Ornamental
Foliage; 07, Edible Vegetables and Certain Roots and Tubers; 08, Edible Fruit
and Nuts, Peel of Citrus Fruits or Melons; 10, Cereals; 12, Oil Seeds and
Oleaginous Fruits, Miscellaneous Grains, Seeds, and Fruit, Industrial or
Medicinal Plants, Straw and Fodder; 15, Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils
and Their Cleavage Products, Prepared Edible Fats, Animal or Vegetable
Waxes; 18, Cocoa and Cocoa Preparations; 19, Preparations of Cereals,
Flour, Starch or Milk, Pastrycooks’ Products; 20, Preparations of Vegetables,
Fruit, Nuts or Other Parts of Plants; 22, Beverages, Spirits, and Vinegar; 23,
Residues and Waste From the Food Industries, Prepared Animal Fodder.
• The Community and Poland shall grant each other the concessions re-
ferred to in Annexes Xa (imports of bovine animal), Xb (some prod-
ucts of chapters 01, 02—Meat and Edible Meat Oﬀal, 04), Xc (some
products of chapters 07, 08, 20) and XI on a harmonious and recipro-
cal basis, in accordance with the conditions laid down therein.
Annex Xa speciﬁed that “In case the number of animals ﬁxed in the frame-
work of the balance sheet arrangements foreseen in Regulation (EEC) No.
805/68 are lower than a reference quantity, a global tariﬀquota equal to the
diﬀerence between that reference quantity and the number of animals ﬁxed
under the balance sheet arrangements will be opened to imports from
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.” Trade in agricultural goods was to
remain subject to quantitative restrictions, which according to Article 20
were to be gradually abolished.
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entry into force of the Agreement the quantitative restrictions on im-
ports originating in the Community listed in Annex IX in accordance
with the conditions established in that Annex.
Annex IX covered Beverages, Spirits, and Vinegar (HS chapter 22).
Appendix C
Evidence of Trade Liberalization 
and Changes in Firm Productivity
In order to shed some light on the channel through which trade liberaliza-
tion may inﬂuence industry premiums, we examine the impact of tariﬀ re-
ductions on the productivity of Polish ﬁrms. This exercise is based on an
unbalanced panel data set of 5,090 ﬁrms operating in Poland during the
period 1996–2000. The information comes from Amadeus, a commercial
database compiled by Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive in-
formation on companies operating in thirty-ﬁve European countries, in-
cluding Poland.3
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we estimate a production
function separately for each sector to get measures of the total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP):4
ln Y it      1 ln Lit    2 ln Kit    2 ln Mit    t   εit,
where Y it represents sales of ﬁrm i in year t, deﬂated by the sectoral deﬂa-
tor taken from the Poland’s Statistical Yearbooks, Lit is the number of em-
ployees, Kitis the value of ﬁxed assets, and Mitis the value of materials used.
Kit and Mit are deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator. The equation also contains
year dummies.
Then we relate the annual changes in TFP to the changes in industry im-
port tariﬀs:
  ln TFP ijt    tariﬀjt    j   uit,
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3. Unfortunately, the version of Amadeus to which we have access does not include the 2001
ﬁgures and is missing employment data from before 1996, which restricts our analysis to the
1996–2001 period.
4. Due to a small number of observations we combine textiles and leather products into one
sector when estimating the production function. We also combine coke and petroleum man-
ufacturing with chemicals.where TFP ijtis the total factor productivity estimated in the ﬁrst stage for
ﬁrm i operating in sector j in year t and tariﬀjt is the tariﬀ on imports of
industry j’s products in year t. In addition to the fourteen manufactur-
ing sectors considered in the paper, we also experiment with including
all sectors and setting tariﬀs on services sectors to zero. Estimating the
equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences allows us to eliminate unobserved time-
invariant characteristics of industry j. Since some industries may be ex-
periencing faster TFP growth due to, for instance, faster technological
progress we also include industry ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation. We re-
port robust standard errors corrected for clustering by industry. To
make the analysis as comparable as possible to the industry premium ex-
ercise, we employ exactly the same industry classiﬁcation and use the
same tariﬀ ﬁgures (with the exception of the sample also encompassing
services industries).
The estimation results, presented in table 8C.1, give support to our hy-
pothesis that trade liberalization is associated with higher productivity at
the ﬁrm level. We ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
the tariﬀ variable both in the sample encompassing all sectors and in the
manufacturing subsample. The results hold for both trade liberalization
vis-à-vis the EU and tariﬀs vis-à-vis the world. The results are also robust
to including in the regression a lagged measure of industry concentration
(Herﬁndahl index).
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Table 8C.1 Total factor productivity and trade liberalization: Estimation on ﬁrst diﬀerences
(dependent variable: total factor productivity)
All sectors Manufacturing only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis  –2.073∗∗ –1.7611∗ –2.0733∗ –2.0987∗
European Union (0.989) (1.0075) (1.0026) (0.9898)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration  –1.1178 0.0908
within an industry) (0.7906) (1.2733)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple average tariﬀ vis-à-vis the world –1.9361∗∗ –1.7026∗ –1.8098∗∗ –1.7552∗∗
(0.8329) (0.8448) (0.8307) (0.8065)
Lagged Herﬁndahl index (i.e., concentration  –1.24 –0.2852
within an industry) (0.7724) (1.1204)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:The number of observations is equal to 6,039 in columns (1) and (2) and 2,420 in columns (3) and
(4). The observations pertain to the period 1996–2000. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by in-
dustry.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.References
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Comment Irene Brambilla
Most exercises that deal with quantifying the eﬀects of a trade liberaliza-
tion episode on wages (or other economic variables) face the common chal-
lenge of how to isolate the eﬀect of changes in trade policy from other si-
multaneous changes in the economy. This issue is particularly relevant in
the case of developing countries, as trade liberalization is usually part of a
more complex reform program that may include the privatization of public
enterprises, deregulation of the economy, restructuring of the tax and pen-
sion systems, and a decrease in the bargaining power of unions. In addi-
tion, oftentimes these reforms have occurred in the context of a currency
crisis or an external debt renegotiation and have involved a reduction in in-
ﬂation, stabilization of the exchange rate, and balancing of the budget. In
the case of Poland, the reforms have been motivated by the transition from
a planned to a market economy, also a clear case in which trade liberaliza-
tion has been part of a broader program of structural reforms.
Several studies—including this one—take advantage of the across-
industry variation in the change in tariﬀs in the attempt to identify the im-
pact of trade liberalization on wages separately from other economic forces.
Gaston and Treﬂer (1994) focus on the United States, Feliciano (2001) on
Mexico, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) on Colombia, and Pavcnik et al.
(2004) on Brazil. It can be the case, however, that changes in trade policy
are correlated with other structural changes across industries, or even
macroeconomic factors, that are omitted in the empirical speciﬁcation.
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search fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Unions that were relatively more inﬂuential than others, for example,
could have negotiated higher beneﬁts in terms of both higher wages and
higher protection for their industry. Changes in exchange rates are likely to
aﬀect industries asymmetrically according to their openness. Additionally,
there is a possibility of reverse causality if, for example, tariﬀs are set to
protect industries where wages are lower. Goh and Javorcik make use of
Poland’s accession to the European Union to claim that the after-reform
tariﬀ levels are exogenously set by the accession to the common market
(free trade between members and a common given tariﬀ for nonmembers).
In the case of Poland, there is a timing dimension that supports the sep-
arate identiﬁcation of the trade liberalization eﬀects more strongly. The
process of macro stabilization and liberalization of the economy began at
the beginning of 1990 (including the elimination of a centrally planned sys-
tem of imports and exports), whereas the tariﬀphase-out period to join the
European Union did not begin until 1994. This timing diﬀerence provides
two potential advantages that may be worth exploring in the paper. First,
presumably by 1994 the initial macro shocks were under control and a large
part of the transition to a market economy had taken place already. The
authors consider the period 1994–2001 in their analysis. The changes in
wages during their time frame are not subjected to the initial wave of re-
forms that occurred during 1990–1993, which might have aﬀected indus-
tries in a nonsymmetric (and potentially correlated with tariﬀs) way. Sec-
ond, the phase-out was nonsimultaneous across industries, with some
industries liberalizing at diﬀerent points in time, providing time variation
in addition to industry variation in the changes in trade policy.
The authors use a series of cross sections from 1994 and 2001 from a La-
bor Force Survey that provide information on wages and workers’ charac-
teristics to run a wage regression. Individual wages are explained by the
usual observed worker characteristics (age, marital status, education, gen-
der, occupation category, private-sector dummy) plus the tariﬀ in the in-
dustry to which that worker is aﬃliated. Time, industry, and region dum-
mies, and several controls at the industry level—such as concentration,
foreign direct investment, stock of capital, and imports and exports—are
also included in the regression. Throughout diﬀerent speciﬁcations, they
ﬁnd that industries with greater tariﬀ reductions are associated with larger
wages. The coeﬃcient on the tariﬀ level ranges from –0.24 to –0.68 (tables
8.5 through 8.8) and is always statistically signiﬁcant, which implies an in-
crease in wages of 2.4 to 6.8 percent for a 10 percent decrease in the tariﬀ
level of that industry. These results are robust to a change in the speciﬁca-
tion of the model, not presented in the current version of the paper, where
industry premiums were computed as a ﬁrst step and later regressed on in-
dustry tariﬀ levels.
It would be informative to analyze the magnitudes implied by the actual
reductions in tariﬀs in more depth. In the main speciﬁcation of table 8.5,
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percent when tariﬀs decline by 10 percent. From ﬁgure 8.4, the decrease in
tariﬀs range from 1 percent to 23 percent when all sectors are included, and
from reductions of 8 to 23 percent when the electricity and gas sector is ex-
cluded. This implies increases in wages from 0.26 percent (electricity and
gas) or 2.08 percent (machinery—the smallest decrease in tariﬀs when
electricity and gas is excluded) to 6 percent (leather). When considering the
changes in the external tariﬀ (vis-à-vis the rest of the world), the changes
in wages range from a decrease of 0.34 percent (electricity and gas) or an
increase of 1.7 percent (machinery—when electricity and gas is excluded)
to an increase of 5.4 percent (nonmetallic products other than rubber and
plastic).
Most strikingly, the ﬁndings reveal a negative relation between wages
and tariﬀs, even after controlling for industry eﬀects, a result that is at odds
with the speciﬁc-factors model and with some previous ﬁndings of studies
of liberalization episodes and wages.1 More speciﬁcally, Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2005) ﬁnd a positive association between tariﬀ and wages in the
case of Colombia. They show that the association becomes negative when
industry eﬀects are not included. Gaston and Treﬂer (1994) ﬁnd a negative
association between tariﬀ and wages in a cross section of U.S. manufactur-
ing industries, but the cross-sectional nature of their data does not allow
for industry eﬀects.
The authors attribute this somewhat surprising result to increases in
productivity in those sectors that liberalized more, which in turn led to an
increase in proﬁts that was partly shared with workers through higher
wages. They mention two sources of increases in productivity—a gain in
eﬃciency due to the increased competition from imports, and easier and
cheaper access to imported intermediate inputs—and brieﬂy explore this
hypothesis empirically by showing that their own estimates of total factor
productivity at the industry level depend positively on the magnitude of the
reduction in tariﬀs.
An additional contributing factor that might be worth exploring is the
fact that as a sector expands it may need to hire workers whose character-
istics are less speciﬁc to what is required in that industry. If workers are not
homogeneous in dimensions that are not captured by the variables in-
cluded in the wage regression—for example, the degree in which they are
suitable for a particular industry—they are likely to receive diﬀerent
wages, and their movement across sectors will aﬀect average wages. As a
sector expands, the ﬁrms in that sector need to hire workers who are less
likely to be trained or specialized to work there. These workers receive a
lower wage than incumbent workers, which drives average wages in the ex-
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1. The wage regression implies some degree of immobility across industries. The speciﬁc-
factors model is the natural theoretical construction to associate to the empirical exercise.panding sector down. The opposite happens in the contracting sector,
where ﬁrms lay oﬀ the less suitable workers and average wages increase.
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